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LAW AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM
William J. Novak∗
To hold the balance true between the material and the human values
of life is the oldest and the newest economic problem.
—Walton Hale Hamilton1

INTRODUCTION
This Essay is part of a larger, ongoing investigation of the role of law in the
creation of a modern American state from 1877 to 1932. That project charts
the decline of an early nineteenth-century world of local, common law selfgovernment (what I called in a previous work a “well-regulated society”2) and
the rise of a distinctly modern administrative regulatory state in the United
States. This new legal-political regime was rooted in three interlinked
developments: the centralization of public power; the individualization of
private right; and the constitutionalization of the rule of law.3 Beginning soon
after the Civil War, nineteenth-century common law understandings of the
public obligations of associative communities in a confederated republic were
increasingly replaced by a new emphasis on the constitutional rights of
individual citizens in a nation-state—a nation-state insistently expanding its
general police and regulatory authority.4

∗ Professor at University of Michigan Law School. I wish to thank helpful and critical colleagues and
audiences at the Emory Law Journal’s Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, the University of Michigan Law
School Fawley Workshop, the National Bureau of Economic Research Economic History Group, and the
Business History Seminar at Harvard Business School.
1 CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: A SERIES OF READINGS IN THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT, at ix (Walton Hale Hamilton ed., rev. ed. 1919).
2 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 1 (1996) (“At the heart of the well-regulated society was a plethora of bylaws, ordinances, statutes,
and common law restrictions” that “dominated United States social and economic policymaking from 1787 to
1877.”).
3 The early nineteenth-century governmental regime is the subject of my first book. See id. Two other
articles highlighting different aspects of the creation of the liberal state are William J. Novak, The Legal
Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,
2002), and William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America, in THE
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 85 (Meg Jacobs et al. eds.,
2003).
4 NOVAK, supra note 2, at 235–48.
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The project has three overarching interpretive objectives. First, it
emphasizes the distinctive power and reach (as opposed to the exceptional
weakness and limits) of the twentieth-century American state created in this
period. In line with a recent wave of revisionist scholarship on American
governance, it holds that the American state is and has been consistently
stronger, larger, more durable, more interventionist, and more redistributive
than accounted for in any earlier U.S. historiography.5 Consequently, it
attempts to come to grips with one of the fundamental yet underexplained facts
of modern American history—the emergence of a global geopolitical and
legal-economic leviathan. Second, the project asserts that law played a
fundamentally positive and creative (as opposed to negative and restrictive)
role in the development of that modern American state. In contrast to an
extensive legal-political literature emphasizing the role of law as primarily a
constitutional limitation on, or hindrance or obstruction to, the growth of the
American state, this project highlights law as a formative and forceful
“technology of public action”6—a distinctive source of expansive
governmental authority in a critical period of United States political and
economic development. Third, and very much related to the special role of law
in American state-building, the project investigates the close interdependence
of expanding central powers and new constitutional liberties. Though
frequently presented as opposed developments, this study argues that the
essence of the governmental regime established in turn-of-the-century America
was the simultaneous centralization of new state powers and the
constitutionalization of new individual rights. The new American state created
in this period was both a jural and a regulatory state—a product of the rule of
law as well as modern political administration.

5 See William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 752 (2008)
(“[While t]he American present witnesses the steady aggrandizement of executive, administrative, emergency,
penal, military, and war powers . . . . the history that America most frequently tells itself highlights a story of
relative powerlessness . . . .”). Some important recent entries in this revisionist project include DANIEL P.
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY
INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001); CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE
STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997); DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL
ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002); Michele Landis Dauber, The
Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387 (2005); Richard R. John, Governmental Institutions as Agents of
Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787–1835, 11 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 347 (1997).
6 I owe the phrase “technology of public action” to Hendrik Hartog, whose work on property law as a
tool of early New York City governance is a classic example of this approach to law. HENDRIK HARTOG,
PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW,
1730–1870, at 66 (1983).
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In the context of this larger story of legal and governmental transformation,
the subject of this particular Essay is economic policy—the origins of modern
American economic regulation. The period from 1877 to 1932 basically marks
the development of modern capitalism in the United States—a realignment of
economic actors and institutions in a market system more industrial, more
organized, and more corporate. Perhaps most importantly, this modern
capitalism was also decidedly more state and policy centered, shaped and
directed by a new legal and political regime of economic rules and regulations
that define this period of American history. Part II of this Essay attempts to
present a new interpretation highlighting this interrelationship of legal
statecraft and modern American capitalism. Subsequent Parts try to bolster
that interpretation with evidence drawn from intellectual history, particularly a
new legal-economic discourse concerning “the social control of business” in
Part III, as well as a case study of the emerging legal concept of public utility
in Part IV. But, of course, the general topic of law and economic regulation in
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era is not exactly terra verde.
Historiographically, it resembles something more akin to a burnt-over district.
So it is perhaps useful at the outset, in Part I, to stake quickly a few interpretive
boundaries so as to make room for new claims.
I. INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND REGULATION
There are basically four different, dominant interpretations of law and
political economy in this period. The oldest, most powerful, and most
tenacious interpretation goes by the name laissez-faire constitutionalism. So
pervasive is this understanding of the relationship of law and economy that I
need merely name it for most to conjure up a favorite example of a
conservative, pro-business, Lochner-era jurisprudence frustrating progressive
economic and social-welfare regulation.
The thesis of laissez-faire
constitutionalism is as old as the Progressive Era itself—invented by a host of
early twentieth-century activist scholars, among them Charles Beard,7 J. Allen
Smith,8 Frank Goodnow,9 and Louis Boudin.10 These scholars were anxious to
7 CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY, 1877–1913, at 54 (1914) (describing
the process of “Writing Laissez Faire into the Constitution”).
8 J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, at vii, xi (1907) (aggressively attacking the
immanent “reactionary” spirit of U.S. constitutional law and “its inherent opposition to democracy, the
obstacles which it has placed in the way of majority rule”).
9 FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION, at v (1911) (opening his investigation
with the straightforward statement of progressive purpose that “to ascertain, from an examination of the
decisions of our courts, . . . to what extent the Constitution of the United States in its present form is a bar to
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impugn an American judiciary that they envisioned as an obstacle to the
legislative and administrative experiments of reform. The progressive critique
of turn-of-the-century jurisprudence was as unsubtle as it was materialist. As
Max Lerner summed up the reigning dogma,
[T]he real Constitution became under capitalism merely the modus
operandi of business enterprise . . . . Capitalist enterprise in America
generated . . . forces in government and in the underlying classes
hostile to capitalistic expansion and bent upon curbing it: it became
the function of the Court to check those forces and to lay down the
lines of economic orthodoxy.11

What is surprising is that despite a rash of critical revisionism dating back to
the late 1960s, including the work of Alan Jones,12 Charles McCurdy,13
Michael Les Benedict,14 Mel Urofsky,15 Barry Cushman,16 and Ted White,17
laissez-faire constitutionalism remains alive and kicking—the dominant
discourse in Howard Gillman’s The Constitution Besieged,18 William Wiecek’s
The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought,19 and Owen Fiss’s Troubled

the adoption of the most important social reform measures which have been made parts of the reform program
of the most progressive peoples of the present day”).
10 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, at viii (1932) (beginning with a typical, acerbic
conclusion that “we are ruled frequently by dead Men . . . generations of dead judges”).
11 Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668, 671–72 (1933); see also
Max Lerner, The Triumph of Laissez-Faire, in PATHS OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 147 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
& Morton White eds., 1963) [hereinafter Lerner, The Triumph of Laissez-Faire]. For one of the finest critical
evaluations of progressive historiography, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS:
TURNER, BEARD, PARRINGTON (1968).
12 Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM.
HIST. 751 (1967).
13 Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some
Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975); Charles W. McCurdy,
The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53
BUS. HIST. REV. 304 (1979).
14 Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985).
15 Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive Era: A
Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63 (1985).
16 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION (1998).
17 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000).
18 HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
19 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN
AMERICA, 1886–1937 (1998).

NOVAK GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

2/24/2011 9:30 AM

LAW & THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM

381

Beginnings of the Modern State,20 as well as the general histories of Robert
McCloskey21 and Kelly, Harbison, and Belz.22
The second important interpretation of law and economic regulation in this
period goes by the name of the capture thesis—a curious example of what can
result when New Left historians and New Right economists agree. The
essence of the capture thesis holds that, when initial economic regulation did
escape the close scrutiny of laissez-faire courts, as in the case of the ICC or the
FCC, for example, the regulation served not the “public interest” professed by
the reformers, but the narrower interests of the regulated businesses
themselves.23 As Chicago School economist George Stigler summed up the
thesis for some unlikely intellectual compatriots in history: “[A]s a rule,
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily
for its benefit.”24 In the hands of “corporate liberal” historians, the capture
theme acquired a somewhat more sinister, class-based edge than the specialinterest or rent-seeking theories of the economists. As James Weinstein put it,
“[B]usinessmen were able to harness to their own ends the desire[s] of
intellectuals and middle class reformers. . . . These ends were the stabilization,
rationalization, and continued expansion of the existing political economy,
and . . . the circumscription of the Socialist movement . . . .”25 Caught between
such twin assaults by left and right, the “public interest” or “public service”
theory of regulation and administration articulated by progressive reformers

20
21
22

8 OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910 (2006).
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (5th ed. 2010).
1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (7th ed.

1991).
23 For early statements, see MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 266 (1955) (“For regulated groups the regulatory process may be one method of converting
public power into private gain.”), and Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the
Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 472 (1952) (describing the “increased dependence” of
the ICC on the railroad industry for support).
24 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971)
(emphasis added). For further discussion of the capture thesis, see Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976), and Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation,
5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974).
25 JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900–1918, at ix–x (1968); see
also GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–
1916 (1963); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916
(1988). Gerald Berk summarized this school of thought in an excellent review essay: “[C]orporate liberal
scholarship, especially in its left-wing variant reintroduced class analysis into the study of twentieth-century
politics, concluding that a powerful cadre of class-conscious corporate elites successfully used the state to
stabilize modern capitalism and co-opt radical policy demands from below.” Gerald Berk, Corporate
Liberalism Reconsidered: A Review Essay, 3 J. POL’Y HIST. 70, 70–71 (1991).
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themselves is often treated as no more than a pipe dream by contemporary
social scientists.26
The third significant interpretation, following Wallace Farnham and Moisei
Ostrogorski, might be termed “The Weakened Spring of [American]
Government”—the idea that the dominant story in the political economy of this
period was a certain structural weakness, or a comparative deficiency, or an
exceptionally limited trajectory in the nature of the American state and its
response to the socioeconomic challenges of modern industrialism.27
Originating in Farnham’s investigation of the role of government in the growth
of the Union Pacific Railroad (which he characterized as a government “hardly
govern[ing] at all”28), the weakened spring thesis has been only reinforced
more recently by American Political Development literature fixated on
demarcating the limited capacity of modern American statecraft in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from Stephen Skowronek’s
characterization of state policy in this period as “patchwork”29 to Theda
Skocpol’s voluminous chartings of the comparative laggardness of the
American social welfare state.30 The list of odd and strained adjectives used to
describe the modern American state is illuminating. The American state is
“uneasy” for Barry Karl,31 “reluctant” for Bruce Jansson,32 “divided” for Jacob

26 Two classic statements of the public interest theory are FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC & ITS
GOVERNMENT (1930), and JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). For some signs of a
renewal of interest in public interest, see MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2002); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285 (2003); David A. Moss & Michael R. Fein, Radio Regulation Revisited: Coase, the FCC, and the Public
Interest, 15 J. POL’Y HIST. 389 (2003).
27 2 M. OSTROGORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 550 (Frederick
Clarke trans., 1902); Wallace D. Farnham, “The Weakened Spring of Government”: A Study in NineteenthCentury American History, 68 AM. HIST. REV. 662, 678 (1963).
28 Farnham, supra note 27, at 663.
29 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920, at 46 (1982) (explaining how a pattern of patchwork reforms
resulted from “the appearance of a series of notable institutional adaptations, each of which was caught in the
unresolved tension between the governing demands of a new age and the triumph of th[e] old governmental
order”).
30 THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1992) (“[I]t seems highly unlikely that the United States will ever converge with the
Western welfare states fashioned between the 1880s and 1960s.”). For an excellent overview and bibliography
of American Political Development, see KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2004).
31 BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945 (1983).
32 BRUCE S. JANSSON, THE RELUCTANT WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICIES (1988).
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Hacker,33 “hidden” for Christopher Howard,34 “inept” for Farnham,35 and
“warped” for Ostrogorski.36
Now, one should immediately notice that there is a certain consonance in
these first three interpretations of the formative era of modern American
political economy. Despite the disagreements of individual authors, it is not
impossible to imagine a synthesis involving a weak and uncertain general
polity, easily captured and dominated regulatory agencies, and marketpolicing, laissez-faire courts. The overarching thrust of such a synthesis is
economy trumping polity, a state deferential to, and incapable of,
autonomously restraining the overweening interests of industrial, corporate
capital.
In just such a synthesis—highlighting a weak and dependent public sphere
and powerful and expansive private interests—does the theme of corruption
become paramount. Corruption was a leitmotif for the progressive reformers.
Beyond the well-known exposés of the muckraking journalists Ida Tarbell,
Lincoln Steffens, and Ray Stannard Baker who gathered around McClure’s
Magazine,37 progressive intellectuals and social scientists mounted a sustained
attack on the perceived corruptions of the Gilded Age. Indeed, historian
Richard L. McCormick has placed the “Discovery That Business Corrupts
Politics”—the awakening of the people to illicit business influence in
American public life—at the very origin of progressive reform.38 Progressives
used corruption in its classic sense indicating the despoiling of a distinctly
collective public sphere (a republic supposedly devoted to res publica—the
public things) by private and individual economic interests. Corruption here is
easy to understand and of an age-old character, with resonances readily
comprehensible in the early republic: fraud, theft, extortion, and bribery by
unvirtuous robber barons and politicos (to use Matthew Josephson’s evocative
terms).39 What was new at the turn of the century was an awareness of the

33 JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002).
34 HOWARD, supra note 5.
35 Farnham, supra note 27, at 678.
36 OSTROGORSKI, supra note 27, at 550.
37 LOUIS FILLER, THE MUCKRAKERS (1993) (originally printed as LOUIS FILLER, CRUSADERS FOR
AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1939)); HAROLD S. WILSON, MCCLURE’S MAGAZINE AND THE MUCKRAKERS (1970).
38 Richard L. McCormick, The Discovery That Business Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins
of Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 247 (1981).
39 MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934); MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS 1865–
1896 (Commons new ed. 2008) (1938).
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unprecedented threat to the polity posed by the arrival of large-scale business
interests in rail, oil, meatpacking, and insurance, whose corruptions were
cataloged in a seemingly endless series of reports and fictions from Charles
and Henry Adams’s Chapters of Erie40 to Frank Norris’s McTeague, The
Octopus, and The Pit.41 Laissez-faire constitutionalism was understood as a
corruption of the American rule of law in precisely this sense—as a usurpation
of the public law by private economic interests and philosophies.42 As
Thorstein Veblen concluded in The Theory of Business Enterprise,
“[C]onstitutional government has, in the main, become a department of the
business organization and is guided by the advice of the business men.”43
Fortunately, however, the laissez-faire, regulatory capture, and weak state
and corruption themes are not the end of commentaries on turn-of-the-century
political economy. There is a fourth coherent “school” of thought on the state
and economic regulation that introduces an interesting note of dissonance.
This school consists primarily of business historians. Alfred Chandler, the
undisputed leading historian of American business, did not write often on
public policy, but when he did, his conclusions were as crystal clear as the title
of his leading article Government Versus Business: An American
Phenomenon.44 Here Chandler emphasized not laissez-faire, not capture, not a
crabbed and laggard state, but rather a distinct adversarial relationship between
an anything but insignificant state and capital, and an anything but deferential
law and business.45 To illustrate the business perspective, Chandler quoted the

40 CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER ESSAYS (Cornell Univ.
Press 1956) (1871).
41 FRANK NORRIS, MCTEAGUE: A STORY OF SAN FRANCISCO (Donald Pizer ed., 2d ed. 1997); FRANK
NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS: A STORY OF CALIFORNIA (Penguin Books 1986) (1901); FRANK NORRIS, THE PIT: A
STORY OF CHICAGO (Penguin Books 1994) (1903).
42 Thus the popular power of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissenting indictment in Lochner v. New York:

This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statics. . . . [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 287 (Cosimo Classics 2005) (1904).
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., Government Versus Business: An American Phenomenon, in THE
ESSENTIAL ALFRED CHANDLER: ESSAYS TOWARD A HISTORICAL THEORY OF BIG BUSINESS 425 (Thomas K.
McCraw ed., 1988); see also Thomas K. McCraw, Business and Government: The Origins of the Adversary
Relationship, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 33 (1984); David Vogel, Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The
Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives, 8 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 45 (1978).
45 CHANDLER, supra note 44.
44
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often-echoed opinion of a former chairman at DuPont: “Why is it that I and my
American colleagues are being constantly taken to court—made to stand
trial—for activities that our counterparts in Britain and other parts of Europe
are knighted, given peerages or comparable honors?”46 In explaining the
rationale for such a common business opinion, Chandler accurately observed
that the “regulation of business became the paramount domestic issue in
American politics in the early twentieth century.”47 Citing the Interstate
Commerce Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts that established a legislative framework for regulation,
antitrust, and administrative commissions, Chandler revealingly concluded, “In
neither Europe nor Japan did any such comparable response [against business]
occur.”48 The exceptional nature of the American response to industrialism, in
other words, lay not in a weak state or special-interest politics but in distinctly
aggressive, “adversarial” economic regulations. As Morton Keller wisely
noted, “The land of the trust was also the land of antitrust.”49
II. LAW AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM
The dissonance between, and the irreconcilability of, business history and
the other three interpretations of the origins of modern American political
economy open up an intriguing question with which to begin a more positive
reconstruction of the relationship between law and economic regulation. What
could the business historians and the laissez-faire constitutionalists be looking
at to give them such diametrically opposed interpretations of the relationship of
law, regulation, and economy in this formative era?
In A History of American Law, Lawrence Friedman summarized the
position of the laissez-faire constitutionalists by quoting from Edward
Corwin’s classic progressive text The Twilight of the Supreme Court, and
noting the five key cases that “annex[ed] the principles of laissez faire
capitalism to the Constitution and put them beyond reach of state legislative
power.”50 The five cases are wholly familiar to students of constitutional

46

Id. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 428.
48 Id. at 425, 427.
49 Morton Keller, The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective,
1900–1930, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 56, 65 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981).
50 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 269–71 (2d ed. 1985) (quoting EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 78 (1934))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
47
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history: Wynehamer v. People;51 In re Jacobs;52 Godcharles v. Wigeman;53
Ritchie v. People;54 and Lochner v. New York.55
Now, in addition to questioning the number of cases on which to base such
a sweeping generalization about law and political economy in this volatile
period, it is also fair to ask whether these cases reflect the most important
fields of economic development and activity: liquor prohibition in Wynehamer,
cigar rolling in tenements in Jacobs, a nail mill in Godcharles, hours of women
in clothing manufactories in Ritchie, and the hours of bakers, again in
tenements, in Lochner. What is not represented by such cases? Nothing less
than some of the dominant sectors of the late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury American economy: (1) transportation and shipping (railroads,
highways, grain elevators, ports, and streetcars); (2) communications
(telegraph and telephone); (3) energy (electricity, water, coal, and petroleum);
(4) agriculture and horticulture; and (5) money and banking.
What do we know about these areas of economic activity? They were the
preeminent areas of industrial and corporate consolidation and expansion in
this period. And they were the areas that attracted the most intense
governmental interest and intervention—the unprecedented regulations that
Alfred Chandler argues generated an antagonistic relationship between
government and business. Indeed, to get ahead of the story just a bit, these
were precisely some of the major sectors of the economy that lawyers,
economists, reformers, and legislators were busily redefining as increasingly
public in nature—public utilities and public services—subject to interventions
ranging from increased police powers to direct rate regulation to outright
public ownership.
In The Economic Basis of Public Interest, Rexford Tugwell provided a
short list of the economic activities that he could envision as essentially public
services by 1922.56
(Bruce Wyman generated a far more extensive
categorization in his earlier two-volume, fifteen hundred page, five thousand

51

13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
53 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886).
54 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895).
55 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
56 REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS
Publishers 1968) (1922).
52

OF

PUBLIC INTEREST 95 (Augustus M. Kelley
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case treatise on public service corporations.)57 Tugwell listed fourteen public
classifications that covered a vast portion of American economic life:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Railways and other common carriers including express
services, oil and gas pipe lines and cab and jitney lines.
Municipal Utilities, so called, such as water, gas, electric light
and power companies and street railways.
Turnpikes, irrigation ditches, canals, waterways and booms.
Hotels.
Telephone, telegraph and wireless lines.
Bridges, wharves, docks and ferries.
Stockyards, abattoirs and grain elevators.
Market places and stock exchanges.
Creameries.
Services for the distribution of news.
Fire insurance businesses.
The business of renting houses.
Banking.
Businesses of preparing for market and dealing in food,
clothing and fuel.58

Tugwell’s list illuminates a fundamental reality about this period obscured
by some common interpretations of law and economic regulation. The
historical period between the end of the Civil War and the start of the New
Deal, far from being marked by a laggard, captured, or constitutionally
frustrated state, was in fact a period of formative governmental interventions
into American economic life that transformed both economy and polity. Well
before the emergency legislative and regulatory experiments of the New Deal,
the American state developed surprising new capacities and techniques to
regulate and control business and commerce. Chandler noted only the most
well-known federal interventions: the Interstate Commerce Act (1887), the
Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), and the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton
Acts (1914).59 The actual regulatory output of both federal and state
governments went substantially further, encompassing economic activities far
beyond the expansive progressive idea of public utility.

57 1 BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS AND ALL OTHERS
ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (1911).
58 TUGWELL, supra note 56.
59 CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 427.

NOVAK GALLEYSFINAL

388

2/24/2011 9:30 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

In 1917 and 1918, John A. Lapp compiled an ambitious and comprehensive
two-volume listing of federal laws, rules, and regulations (a primitive
forerunner to the Federal Register).60 Lapp’s compendium serves as a useful
index for the dramatic expansion of federal economic regulatory law at the turn
of the century. Contending that “scarcely any business can be done involving
shipments across state lines without consulting . . . [the vast number of rules,
regulations, and] restrictions in the interest of the common welfare which the
federal government has thrown about business,” Lapp summarized and
reproduced a range of pioneering federal initiatives, including: (1) federal
banking legislation (including the establishment of the Federal Reserve
System); (2) the Income Tax Act, the Corporation Tax Act, and other federal
revenue regulations; (3) federal food, drug, meat, and narcotics acts; (4) federal
labor regulations, including the Employers’ Liability Acts, child labor
legislation, and assorted public works, safety, and inspection acts; (5) new
trademark, copyright, and bankruptcy legislation; (6) the establishment of the
Public Health Service; (7) an array of federal regulations of horticulture and
agriculture, from farm loans to the quarantine of livestock to the interstate
movement of potatoes; (8) certain federal regulations of immoral commerce,
including the White Slave Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act; (9) the Shipping
Board Act; and (10) the Federal Good Roads Act.61 This explosion of federal
economic legislation was only supplemented by state regulations of commerce
that frequently mirrored, but more often surpassed, federal interventionism.62
While certain aspects of this active state involvement in the American
economy had precedents dating to the early republic (e.g., Hamilton’s reports
on manufactures and money and banking, the public promotion of internal
improvements, state police power regulation of markets and goods, and Henry

60 JOHN A. LAPP, IMPORTANT FEDERAL LAWS (1917) [hereinafter LAPP, FEDERAL LAWS]; JOHN A. LAPP,
FEDERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS (1918).
61 LAPP, FEDERAL LAWS, supra note 60, at iii.
62 Milton Handler provides a useful listing of state regulations of unfair competition (mostly established
before 1932) that complements Lapp’s federal story: (a) antitrust laws; (b) trademark statutes; (c) food and
drugs legislation; (d) labeling laws; (e) prohibitory legislation (e.g., cigarettes and oleomargarine); (f) chain
store tax laws; (g) peddling and itinerant seller laws; (h) statutes prohibiting sales below cost or secret rebates;
(i) legislation prohibiting the use of trading stamps and lotteries; (j) regulations of weights and measures; (k)
fair trade acts; (l) acts prohibiting use of another’s list of customers; (m) restrictions on advertising, including
billboard regulation; and (n) proration laws controlling production. Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21
IOWA L. REV. 175, 232–35 (1936). Unfair competition is but one area of state economic and commercial
regulation. A full listing would also have to include labor regulations, commercially significant health and
safety rules, licensing, and professional regulations, among others.
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Clay’s so-called American System),63 it would be a mistake to overemphasize
the continuities. The crises of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
industrial, corporate capitalism were far removed from the developmental
issues involved in the emerging commercial, maritime, trade, and urban market
economies of the antebellum years. The regulatory controls were consequently
of a different order. Federal and centralized techniques augmented and often
displaced state and local regulations in an effort to address the problems of a
consolidated and cartelized national economy.64 Moreover, those techniques
were increasingly administrative—the product of federal independent
regulatory commissions newly invented to investigate, police, and direct the
interstate market as never before. Finally, and relatedly, the common law
framework of early American economic regulation ultimately gave way to a
federal constitutional jurisprudence focused on the proliferation of the new
statutory and administrative rules and regulations progressively governing
more and more areas of the nation’s economy.
These regulations mark a new era in government-business relations in the
United States and a reconfiguration of the relationship of law and American
capitalism—a revolution in political economy missed by traditional
interpretations highlighting anachronisms like a self-regulating market, a
backward polity, and laissez-faire legalism. This Essay proposes an alternative
understanding of this revolution and the interactions among law, statecraft, and
industrial commerce at its core. Taking cues from the works of Morton
Keller,65 Harry Scheiber,66 Louis Galambos,67 and Douglass North,68 it first
emphasizes the overwhelming reality of what Claudia Goldin and Gary
Libecap dubbed a “Regulated Economy” in this period—a perspective centered
on the proliferation of new state actions and institutions controlling American

63

RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2004); JONATHAN R. T. HUGHES, THE GOVERNMENTAL
HABIT: ECONOMIC CONTROLS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1977); JOHN LAURITZ LARSON,
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE
EARLY UNITED STATES (2001); GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION 1815–1860
(1989); Robert A. Lively, The American System: A Review Article, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 81 (1955).
64 LAPP, FEDERAL LAWS, supra note 60; WALTER THOMPSON, FEDERAL CENTRALIZATION: A STUDY AND
CRITICISM OF THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION (1923); JAMES T. YOUNG, THE NEW
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS WORK (1916).
65 MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN
AMERICA, 1900–1933 (1990).
66 UNITED STATES ECONOMIC HISTORY (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1964).
67 Louis Galambos, The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History, 44 BUS. HIST.
REV. 279 (1970).
68 DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., GROWTH AND WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST (3d ed. 1983).
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economic life.69 Also, drawing lightly on some of the theoretical work of
postwar German critical theory as well as the more recent contributions of the
French Regulationist School, I view this enormous rise in regulation not as a
simple political adjustment or crisis intervention but as more generally
reflective of the socially embedded and systematically regulated nature of
modern capitalism.70 This regulation marks the emergence of a distinctive and
new form of political-economic organization in the United States in which
business and economic factors, far from determining legal and political
arrangements (as in most of the interpretations explored in Part I), are
themselves the subjects of a conscious and consistent legal and political
manipulation as never before. Friedrich Pollock called this realignment “State
Capitalism,”71 though Andrew Shonfield’s moniker “Modern Capitalism,”
highlighting a “Changing Balance of Public and Private Power” is perhaps
more applicable to the American experience.72 Pollock captured the essence of
the transformation when he argued, “The replacement of the economic means
by political means as the last guarantee for the reproduction of economic life,
changes the character of the whole historic period. It signifies the transition
from a predominantly economic to an essentially political era.”73
Emphasizing the active political construction of modern American
capitalism by definition requires a more thorough reckoning with the rule of

69 THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY (Claudia Goldin &
Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994).
70 See, e.g., MICHEL AGLIETTA, A THEORY OF CAPITALIST REGULATION: THE US EXPERIENCE (David
Fernbach trans., 1979); THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996).
71 Friedrich Pollock, State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT
SCHOOL READER 71 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., 1982).
72 ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
POWER (1965). Shonfield’s analysis is particularly right on the mark with regard to the early role of
government in American capitalism: “Historically, American capitalism in its formative period was much
readier to accept intervention by public authority than British capitalism.” Id. at 301. He makes a mistake in
giving too much credence to the rise of laissez-faire in what he terms “The Reversal of the Late Nineteenth
Century.” Id. at 304.
73 Pollock, supra note 71, at 78. Jürgen Habermas also offers a useful description of this transformation:

The expression “organized or state-regulated capitalism” refers to two classes of phenomena,
both of which can be attributed to the advanced stage of the accumulation process. It refers, on
the one hand, to the process of economic concentration—the rise of national and, subsequently,
of multinational corporations—and to the organization of markets for goods, capital, and labor.
On the other hand, it refers to the fact that the state intervenes in the market as functional gaps
develop.
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 33 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975) (footnote omitted).
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law and a revision of some common assumptions about the relationship of law
to state-building. For, in contrast to the dominant techniques and strategies of
continental European statecraft, the technologies of American state
development and regulation in this period were overwhelmingly legal in nature
and in practice. And far from impeding new state economic controls,
American public and private law were in fact sources of innovative tools and
instrumental ideas through which a new relationship between the American
state and modern capitalism was forged. What were some of these positive
legal technologies of state action? The final Part of this Essay explores one
such legal device in a bit of detail—the emerging concept of public utility. But
the period was replete with many other examples of law creatively supplying
foundational ideas, frameworks, precedents, and tools for modern American
state-building and economic regulation. Two of the most important were an
expanding conception of state police power (which moved increasingly in the
direction of a de facto federal police power in this period) and the invention of
modern administrative law (which produced the new independent
administrative agencies expanding the jurisdiction and capacities of federal
economic regulation). But the roles of law and legal institutions also should
not be overlooked in the development of such things as professional and
occupational licensing, workers’ compensation, municipal justice reform,
antitrust and a law of “unfair competition,” as well as potent new federal
powers to tax and to spend.
In the period from 1877 to 1932, a distinctive new state was created in the
United States. Reformers, jurists, and legislators consciously constructed
through law a new sphere of sovereignty and creatively destroyed and
expropriated the powers of competing political-economic jurisdictions. This
process included the forging of new national loyalties via the establishment of
new citizenship rights and liberties, the invention of new mechanisms of social
and cultural policing, and the establishment of a nationally regulated market
for production, labor, and consumption. This state-building project relied
fundamentally on law, and it reflected anything but weakness, backwardness,
or a governmental willingness to “leave alone.” Legal and constitutional
history’s obsession with classical and orthodox legal doctrines like laissez-faire
constitutionalism, legal formalism, class legislation, and the public-private
distinction, as well as economic formulas of regulatory capture, business selfinterest, and corporate liberalism has to some extent occluded an appreciation
of this more fundamental shift from economic to legal-political priorities.
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III. THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS
But the legal-political construction of the modern American regulatory
state was not solely a product of the imaginations of social theorists or the
reinterpretations of revisionist historians. To the contrary, it was explicitly
advanced by a historical community of thinkers and reformers that consciously
crafted an ambitious agenda of legal and political intervention—in effect, a
legal-intellectual framework for economic regulation. The language and
proposals of this group of economists and law writers played a key role in the
development of new legal and political controls over the burgeoning national
economy. The central tenet of this activist and professional discourse was
something these thinkers dubbed “the social control of business.”74
Key figures and formative texts in this political-economic discourse
included Henry Carter Adams’s Relation of the State to Industrial Action and
Economics and Jurisprudence;75 Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of Business
Enterprise;76 Richard T. Ely’s Property and Contract in Their Relations to the
Distribution of Wealth;77 John R. Commons’s Legal Foundations of
Capitalism;78 John Maurice Clark’s Social Control of Business;79 Bruce
Wyman’s Control of the Market;80 Samuel P. Orth’s compilation Readings on
the Relation of Government to Property and Industry;81 Robert Lee Hale’s
Freedom Through Law;82 Walton Hamilton’s The Politics of Industry;83 and
Rexford G. Tugwell’s The Economic Basis of Public Interest.84 Many in this
group of political economists are wholly familiar figures in economic and legal
74 JOHN MAURICE CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1926); JOHN DEWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS,
ETHICS 459–71 (rev. ed. 1932); BRUCE WYMAN, CONTROL OF THE MARKET: A LEGAL SOLUTION OF THE
TRUST PROBLEM (1911).
75 HENRY CARTER ADAMS, Economics and Jurisprudence, in TWO ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER ADAMS
135 (Joseph Dorfman ed., reprt. ed. 1969); HENRY CARTER ADAMS, Relation of the State to Industrial Action,
in TWO ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER ADAMS, supra, at 57 [hereinafter ADAMS, Relation of the State to
Industrial Action].
76 VEBLEN, supra note 43.
77 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
(1914).
78 JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924).
79 CLARK, supra note 74.
80 WYMAN, supra note 74.
81 READINGS ON THE RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO PROPERTY AND INDUSTRY (Samuel P. Orth ed.,
1915).
82 ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER
(1952).
83 WALTON HAMILTON, THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRY (1957).
84 TUGWELL, supra note 57.
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historiography. Barbara Fried dubbed some of them “the First Law and
Economics Movement.”85 But the positive role of these active thinkers in
constructing the legal-institutional apparatus of the American regulatory state
still remains undervalued by history. Moreover, the extensive work of some—
like Bruce Wyman on public service corporations or Walton Hamilton on
almost every aspect of price controls—has been almost completely neglected.
Like Ernst Freund and Frank Goodnow—arguably the foremost legal architects
of the modern American administrative and regulatory state86—their technical
achievements have been obscured by a focus on the more visible and easily
digestible achievements of muckraking and trustbusting progressives like
Theodore Roosevelt.
In the earliest texts in this tradition, the discovery that business corrupts
politics remained a central theme. In 1887, for example, Henry Carter Adams
drew “a close connection between the rise of the menacing power of
corporations and the rise of municipal corruption” and called for greater
industrial responsibility to “conserve true democracy” and overcome the
corrupt tyrannies of corporations and “commercial democracy.”87 But in the
extended progressive struggle with the problem of monopoly through the late
nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, business was increasingly viewed
as a threat not simply because of its political influence or its potential
corruption of local, state, or national governance (much less because of ancient
economic evils like fraud, extortion, or bribery). Rather, progressives
increasingly considered monopoly and the concentration of economic interests
as a problem in and of themselves with grave implications for what legal
historian Willard Hurst called the “balance of power.”88 Hurst understood the

85 BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST
LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
86 Ernst Freund’s most important works were ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS
AND PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (1928), and ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904). Frank J. Goodnow’s more general statements include FRANK J.
GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (1916); FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT (1900); FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1911).
87 HENRY C. ADAMS, RELATION OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION 69, 76 (Baltimore,
Guggenheimer, Weil & Co. 1887). For an excellent discussion of the economics and jurisprudence of Adams,
see Ajay K. Mehrota, Creating the Modern American Fiscal State: The Political Economy of U.S. Tax Policy,
1880–1930 (Dec. 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with Joseph
Regenstein Library, University of Chicago).
88 James Willard Hurst, Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary Legal Order, 24 OKLA. L. REV.
224, 232 (1971).
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balance of power as a first-order principle of American constitutionalism.89 He
defined it as the idea that
any kind of organized power ought to be measured against criteria
of ends and means which are not defined or enforced by the
immediate power holders themselves. It is as simple as that: We
don’t want to trust any group of power holders to be their own
judges upon the ends for which they use the power or the ways in
which they use it.90
In the early twentieth century, an increasing number of legal and economic
commentators came to see the growing economic force of big business as a
constitutional problem in this sense: as an imbalance of power in the United
States. Robert Lee Hale was but the most persuasive progressive writer on this
theme. In a series of essays later collected in Freedom Through Law: Public
Control of Private Governing Power, Hale argued that the new concentrations
of private economic power were slowly taking on many of the attributes
formerly thought of as the exclusive prerogative of public sovereignty.91 Hale
held that these new forms of “private government” were just as capable of
exercising social force and coercion and destroying liberty as “public
government itself.”92 But whereas public sovereignty had been the subject of
developing constitutional protections since the seventeenth century at least,
these new forms of private sovereignty were as yet unrestrained and
uncontrolled by law. The problem of private governmental power in trusts,
unions, corporations, and other large associations became the focus of legaleconomic inquiry and reform in the first decades of the twentieth century
precisely because they appeared to exist beyond the traditional jurisdictions of
state sovereignty and common law. An adequate legal-governmental remedy
to this problem was not to be found in a series of laws insulating the political
process from economic influence (yet alone a traditional reliance on common
law litigation and ex post criminal prosecution). Rather, the problem of
monopoly and private-governing power, in the eyes of many of progressive
authorities, required new legal and legislative restraints—an expansion of the
economic police power of the state setting up government as a countervailing

89

Id. at 225.
Id. For a more complete discussion of Hurst’s perspective, see William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism,
and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97 (2000).
91 HALE, supra note 82, at vii.
92 Id.; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q.
470 (1923).
90
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regulatory force to the power of business and organization in American
socioeconomic life. Though antimonopoly had deep roots in the AngloAmerican legal tradition, this legal-economic analysis broke with earlier
republican and Jacksonian and post-Civil War understandings of corruption by
viewing private economic organizations as having a threatening center of
power and sovereignty irrespective of any direct illegality or undue influence
on the polity.
By the early twentieth century, this more structural critique of private
economic power, together with reform proposals for new public economic
regulations, were synthesized and extended in the progressive call for the
social control of industry, business, and the market.93 By the time one gets to
the analyses of John Maurice Clark or Walton Hale Hamilton94 “corruption” or
“illegality” were no longer central problematics. Unscrupulous businessmen
or politicians were not even on the radar screen, and the concentration of
economic power was even seen as a potentially beneficent inevitability. From
corruption and monopoly, these theorists moved to a more systemic
investigation of some of the structural weaknesses of business, markets, and
capitalism itself. Looking beyond litigation and even police power regulation,
these lawyers and economists proposed much more involved and complicated
remedies for economic problems seen as systemic rather than aberrational,
remedies including public ownership, overt price controls, and the founding of
new permanent institutions for investigating and controlling American
economic life.95 Well before the economic catastrophe known as the Great
Depression, these legal and economic thinkers had formulated an ambitious
plan for the public social control of the American economy through ongoing
administrative governance and economic planning. They envisioned the state
not as an economic policeman or even as a countervailing force to private
economic power, but as a full, interactive partner in a legal-economic vision of
modern state capitalism.96

93 One can get some sense of the evolution of this perspective in the early twentieth century by
examining changes in the key texts over time from WYMAN, supra note 74, to CLARK, supra note 74, to
DEXTER MERRIAM KEEZER & STACY MAY, THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS: A STUDY OF ANTITRUST LAW
ENFORCEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATION, AND GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS (1930), to
READINGS IN THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF INDUSTRY (Am. Econ. Ass’n ed., 1942).
94 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 74; HAMILTON, supra note 83.
95 See, e.g., WALTON HAMILTON, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES (1938); CARL D. THOMPSON, MUNICIPAL
OWNERSHIP (1917); Malcolm Rutherford, On the Economic Frontier: Walton Hamilton, Institutional
Economics, and Education, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 611 (2003).
96 See HAMILTON, supra note 83.
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The progressive movement for the social control of business built directly
on the influential sociological work on general social control of Charles Horton
Cooley and E.A. Ross.97 The language of socialization that permeated so
much progressive reform owed more to these theories of modern social change
than to the political agenda of socialism.98 The essence of these theories held
that the fin-de-siècle United States was undergoing an epochal transformation
from traditional to modern forms of social and economic organization. In this
massively dislocating process, older mechanisms of control and order were
rapidly being rendered obsolete with potentially dire consequences. Ross, like
so many other social scientists of the era, drew directly on Ferdinand Tönnies’s
work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft99:
[P]owerful forces are more and more transforming community into
society, that is, replacing living tissue with structures held together
by rivets and screws. . . . [N]atural bonds, that were many and firm
when the rural neighborhood or the village community was the type
of aggregation, no longer bind men as they must be bound in the
huge and complex aggregates of to-day.100

Economic and technological changes were crucial harbingers of this
transformation. As Clark noted, “We are living in the midst of a revolution—a
revolution which is transforming the character of business, the economic life
and economic relations of every citizen, and the powers and responsibilities of
the community toward business. . . .”101 A particularly acute sense of crisis,
uncertainty, and fear surrounded thinking about the economic consequences of
this revolution. Clark warned explicitly of the potential for “bloody social
warfare” and “catastrophe”102 in concurrence with Ross’s ominous forecast:
“The grand crash may yet come through the strife of classes. . . . But if it
comes, it will be due to the thrust of new, blind, economic forces we have not
learned to regulate. . . .”103
97 CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: A STUDY OF THE LARGER MIND (1909); EDWARD
ALSWORTH ROSS, SOCIAL CONTROL: A SURVEY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF ORDER (1901); see also Helen
Everett, Social Control, in 4 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 344, 345 (1931). For a broad
survey of the potential impact of the idea of social control on social and cultural policing in the early twentieth
century, see MABEL A. ELLIOT & FRANCIS E. MERRILL, SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION (3d ed. 1934).
98 For an excellent discussion of the role of socialization in law, see MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF
COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO (2003).
99 FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (Charles P. Loomis ed. and trans., 1957).
100 ROSS, supra note 97, at 432–33 (footnote omitted).
101 CLARK, supra note 74, at 3.
102 Id. at 4.
103 ROSS, supra note 97, at 436.

NOVAK GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

2/24/2011 9:30 AM

LAW & THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM

397

From this perspective, corruption and the problem of monopoly were
primarily indicators of a much larger socioeconomic crisis. And the central
question was what new forms of control would arise to contain and regulate the
new concentrations and organizations of economic power. The legal-economic
movement for the social control of business had many particular solutions to
particular problems, but what they all had in common was an increased
willingness to use the state—to turn to law and government—as the most
effective tool of economic control. As Clark argued, “The most definite and
powerful agent of society is government, and in this country the municipal,
state, and federal governments between them exercise the formal, legal power
of control in economic life.”104 Though space here does not allow a thorough
exploration of the important programmatic details with which reformers
successfully made the case for the state control of the market, Clark provided
an excellent overview of the vision as well as the accomplishments of the
movement circa 1922:
This period of fifty years has seen the growth of effective control of
railroads and of public utilities; while electricity and the telephone
have developed, first, into recognized public utilities, and, second,
into businesses which transcend state boundaries and thus become
essentially national problems. Irrigation, land reclamation and flood
prevention also belong properly in the class of interstate public
interests, while radio and aerial navigation have but recently been
added to the list. The trust movement and anti-trust laws,
conservation, the Federal Reserve system, vast developments in labor
legislation, social insurance, minimum-wage laws . . . and the
growing control of public health, prohibition, control over markets
and marketing, enlarged control over immigration and international
trade, city-planning and zoning, and municipal control of municipal
growth in general, all have come about within this period. On the
frontier are health insurance, the control of the business cycle and of
unemployment, and the insertion of social control within the structure
of industry itself, through the “democratization of business.” Back of
these stand the stabilization of the dollar, and all the questions raised
by birth control and the movement toward eugenics, while the control
of large fortunes and of the unequal distribution of wealth is an
ancient and ever new question which is becoming more and more
acute as the masses gain a growing sense of their political power.
This many-sided movement toward control cannot be
disregarded. . . . It may be guided and directed, its movements made
104

CLARK, supra note 74, at 8.
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more informed and enlightened, but it cannot be stopped, and no one
105
group can dictate its course.

Lest one think that such views were marginal, outside the mainstream in the
economic and business community of the 1920s, Clark’s text on social control
was written as a set of “Materials for the Study of Business” in the School of
Commerce and Administration at the University of Chicago.106
As Clark’s list of legal and legislative accomplishments suggests, the
movement for the social control of business and the market was not simply a
discourse (let alone a doctrine). Rather, it involved a broad legal and political
strategy for expanding state and federal police power, the overruling power of
the state to regulate persons, organizations, liberty, property, and contract in
the general interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. And despite a
secondary literature that continues to emphasize the constitutional limitations
of a handful of state supreme court and U.S. Supreme Court cases, the
overwhelming story of the police power from 1877 to 1932 is one of insistent
expansion. Measuring the incidence of something as categorically amorphous
as police power regulation is notoriously difficult. Still, by the end of this
period (but before the New Deal), Congress was passing roughly 1,700 new
statutes per session, and states like New York and South Carolina over
1,000.107 By even the most conservative estimates, one-third of these new
statutes were regulatory in nature.108 And as Charles Warren concluded as
early as 1913, the vast majority of this regulatory legislation was readily
sustained.109 Something of the efficacy of such controls on economic activity
(which does not include private litigation or administrative actions) was
105

Id. at 4–5.
CLARK, supra note 74.
107 C.E. Merriam, Government and Society, in RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1489,
1515 (1933); Ralph F. Fuchs, The Quantity of Regulatory Legislation, 16 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 51, 52 (1930).
108 Fuchs, supra note 107, at 53
109 See Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power—The United States Supreme Court, 13
COLUM. L. REV. 667 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Bulwark]; Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (1913). Warren famously concluded that the vast bulk
of state regulatory legislation passed between 1887 and 1911 was upheld by the courts, including
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anti-lottery laws; anti-trust and corporate monopoly laws; liquor laws; food, game, oleomargarine
and other inspection laws; regulation of banks, telegraph and insurance companies; cattle, health
and quarantine laws; regulation of business and property of water, gas, electric light, railroad
(other than interstate trains) and other public service corporations . . . ; negro-segregation laws;
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immigration.
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suggested when AT&T vice president Charles DuBois urged AT&T president
Theodore Vail to consider government control in 1913—“a telephone and
telegraph service ‘under the direct and permanent control and administrative
responsibility of the federal government’”—as one way to escape the onerous
corporate burden of local and state regulations.110 The extent that states were
willing to go to control economic activity when necessary was suggested by
the extreme action of Governor Ross Sterling of Texas who, in 1931, declared
martial law in the East Texas oil fields in an effort to enforce the Texas
Railroad Commission’s petroleum production controls.111
Now these are nothing more than illustrations, and a convincing
counterargument to the four interpretations of law and political economy
outlined at the start of this Essay requires a much more sustained and
systematic presentation of ideas, statutes, and cases than is possible here. But
perhaps one final concrete example of legal-economic policy making can
suggest some of the interpretive possibilities in reexamining economic
regulation in the Progressive Era with an eye toward the active state-building
project outlined here.
IV. PUBLIC UTILITY
One of the most important developments in the regulation of economic
activity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and a perfect
example of the creative force of law in the construction of the American
regulatory state, was the legal invention of the idea of the public utility.
Though the problem of antimonopoly and the development of state and federal
antitrust law typically receive more historical attention, progressive lawyers
and economists understood the law of public utilities (what Bruce Wyman
termed the law of “public service corporations”112) to be a crucial battleground
in the development of American regulation. Today the concept of public
utility has lost quite a bit of luster and most of its political aspirations—a
product of contemporary privatization as well as a tendency to take utilities for
granted. But as Rexford Tugwell’s list of public interest services suggests,113
progressives viewed the law of public utilities as a vibrant and expansive arena
for experimenting with unprecedented governmental control over business,

110
111
112
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RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 376 (2010).
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
See WYMAN, supra note 57.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

NOVAK GALLEYSFINAL

400

2/24/2011 9:30 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

industry, and the market. While today most would restrict the idea of public
utility to a couple of closely circumscribed industries (water, electricity, gas),
in the early twentieth century, the utility idea encompassed urban
transportation, railroads, motor bus and truck, telecommunications, radio,
pipelines, warehouses, stockyards, ice plants, banking, insurance, milk, fuel,
and packing.114 For progressive legal and economic reformers, the legal
concept of public utility was capable of justifying state economic controls
ranging from statutory police regulation to administrative rate setting to
outright public ownership of the means of production. Indeed, the public
utility idea was so capable of further growth as to ultimately produce one of
the most ambitious administrative and regional planning initiatives of the New
Deal—the Tennessee Valley Authority.115
The roots of a law of public utilities, of course, extended well back into the
early republic. Early American common law recognized a clear category of
economic activities including innkeepers and ferry, cart, and coach companies
as distinctly public in nature—common callings or common carriers subject to
special restrictions and regulations in the public interest.116 The idea received
additional support from the wide variety of mixed public-private enterprises—
turnpikes, canals, railroads—that fueled the antebellum transportation
revolution.117 But the legal history of public utilities only really exploded after
the influential United States Supreme Court decision in Munn v. Illinois in
1877.118 In that well-known case dealing with the constitutional legitimacy of
so-called Granger laws, the Court upheld an Illinois statute regulating the rates
for the storage of grain in the warehouses and elevators operating around the

114 Ben W. Lewis, Public Utilities, in 2 GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE: DEVELOPMENT AND
CURRENT ISSUES OF AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 616 & n.1 (1940).
115 DAVID E. LILIENTHAL, TVA: DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH (5th ed. 1953); PHILIP SELZNIK, TVA AND
THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY OF POLITICS AND ORGANIZATION (1980). For an excellent examination of the
importance of public utilities and public works in the New Deal, see JASON SCOTT SMITH, BUILDING NEW
DEAL LIBERALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 1933–1956 (2006).
116 NOVAK, supra note 2, at 92 (1996); see also BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN
LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865–1920 (2001) (analyzing the effects of
railroads and street cars on the development of law and individual liberties); A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers,
Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 LAW & HIST. REV.
53 (2005) (discussing equality in public spaces and its relationship to the civil rights movement).
117 See CARTER GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS 1800–
1890 (1960); HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY,
1820–1861 (1969); George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815–1860, in 4 THE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1951).
118 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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mouth of the Chicago River.119 Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite sustained the
rate regulation as a legitimate exercise of the state police power—the power of
Illinois to legislate in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and
welfare.120 He did so by arguing that grain elevators (like ferries, railroads,
bridges, and navigable waterways historically) were businesses “affected with
a public interest” and consequently subject to extraordinary regulatory controls
(including the legislative setting of rates and prices) for the common good.121
Business “affected with a public interest” thus entered the legal-economic
lexicon as a constitutional test for determining what economic activities could
be considered public utilities subject to special state regulatory controls.122
The Munn decision has been the subject of extensive historical
commentary, which need not be rehearsed here.123 What is significant for the
argument of this Essay, however, is the degree to which most historians agree
that Chief Justice Waite’s opinion and particularly the line drawn around
businesses affected with a public interest marked a typical constitutional
limitation on the power of the American state and regulation that would last
until the New Deal,124 or at least until the equally important Depression Era
milk-regulation case Nebbia v. New York.125 Chief Justice Waite’s public
interest doctrine, the argument goes, only succeeded in further insulating from
police power regulation business not deemed affected with a public interest,
especially as laissez-faire constitutionalism gained a firmer hold over late
nineteenth-century jurisprudence. In depicting the triumph of laissez-faire in
law, Max Lerner held that Munn, along with the Slaughter-House Cases,126
stood out “in melancholy solitude as part of the ‘road not taken’ when two
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121 Id. at 130 (quoting Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 78 (Dublin, Francis Hargrave ed., 1787)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
122 Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930); Breck P. McAllister,
Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930).
123 See, e.g., GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS (1971); Harry N. Scheiber, The
Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 329 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971); Hamilton, supra note 122;
McAllister, supra note 122; Molly Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy,
1789–1920, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1403.
124 See, e.g., Lerner, The Triumph of Laissez Faire, supra note 11; Harry N. Scheiber, Law and Political
Institutions, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 487, 501 (Glenn Porter ed., 1980).
125 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a New York statute setting the price of milk and holding that private
contracts can be regulated by the government when public need would mandate regulation).
126 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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paths diverged for the Supreme Court in the constitutional wood.”127 Even
Harry Scheiber, who along with his students has done more than anyone to
illuminate the public regulatory power of the legal doctrines underlying Chief
Justice Waite’s opinion in Munn, in the end concluded that the public interest
doctrine proved to be as much a restraint on the power of the state as an
enabling doctrine: “The Munn doctrine was fated to become, in the hands of an
increasingly conservative Supreme Court, an equally effective shield against
public regulation for business the court deemed strictly private.”128
This narrow reading of Munn together with a relative neglect of the role of
public utility law in progressive reform very much conforms to a
historiography that privileges laissez-faire, capture, and an uneasy state. But
far from a “road not taken,” Munn was the very superhighway down which
reformers drove a truckload of far-reaching experiments in the state regulation
of new economic activity. And the ramifications went beyond economic
matters alone. The very next time the phrase “affected with a public interest”
was used in the Supreme Court was by Justice John Marshall Harlan in an
attempt (for the time being unsuccessful) to widen the constitutional arena for
civil rights regulation in the Civil Rights Cases:
The doctrines of Munn v. Illinois have never been modified by
this court, and I am justified, upon the authority of that case, in
saying that places of public amusement, conducted under the
authority of the law, are clothed with a public interest, because used
in a manner to make them of public consequence and to affect the
community at large. The law may therefore regulate, to some extent,
the mode in which they shall be conducted, and, consequently, the
public have rights in respect of such places, which may be vindicated
by the law. It is consequently not a matter purely of private
129
concern.

Over the next fifty years, the Supreme Court with few exceptions used the
phrase “affected with a public interest” to uphold a wide variety of extensive
economic regulations. In Western Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, the Court used the
language to sustain a California statute regulating admission policies at “any
opera house, theatre, melodeon, museum, circus, caravan, race-course, fair, or

127

Lerner, The Triumph of Laissez-Faire, supra note 11, at 159.
Scheiber, supra note 124, at 501. For Scheiber’s definitive and influential study of Munn, see
Scheiber, supra note 123. See also Selvin, supra note 122.
129 109 U.S. 3, 42 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
128

NOVAK GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

2/24/2011 9:30 AM

LAW & THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM

403

other place of public amusement or entertainment.”130 State appellate courts
used Munn to even greater regulatory effect.131 Moreover, the Court made
perfectly clear that the fact that a business or industry was not deemed to be
legally affected with a public interest did not insulate that activity from
ordinary police power regulations. In Schmidinger v. City of Chicago and
Holden v. Hardy the Court upheld a detailed regulation of the sale of bread in
Chicago and an eight-hour day for Utah workers in mines and smelters without
ever even acknowledging counsel’s contention that those police power
regulations required a special finding of business affected with a public
interest.132
Contrary to some well-established interpretations regarding the relationship
of law and economic regulation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Munn v. Illinois did not mark the beginnings of an era of
constitutional limitations or classical legal thought or a state capitulating to
business. On the contrary, Munn inaugurated an extraordinary era of
innovation in the social control of business, industry, and the market. It set in
motion a panoply of new ideas like public utilities, rate regulation, price
discrimination, fair rate of return, valuation, just price, and economic planning
that dominated the legal and economic treatises of the era. It propelled an
agenda of economic regulation and controls that culminated in some of the
more far-reaching experiments in public and government ownership of
economic enterprises in United States history.133 Felix Frankfurter, from his
perspective as one of the central legal advocates for the increased social
control of business in the early twentieth century, understood exactly the
implications of Munn and early public utilities law for the economic statebuilding project of progressivism. In an extraordinary essay on rate regulation
130
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that he wrote with Henry Hart for the original Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences, Frankfurter summed up the accomplishment:
The resultant contemporary separation of industry into businesses
that are “public,” and hence susceptible to manifold forms of control,
of which price supervision is one aspect, and all other businesses,
which are private, is thus a break with history. But it has built itself
into the structure of American thought and law; and while the line of
division is a shifting one and incapable of withstanding the stress of
economic dislocation, its existence in the last half century made
possible, within a selected field, a degree of experimentation in
governmental direction of economic activity of vast import and
134
beyond any historical parallel.

The public interest doctrine of Munn did not insulate private business from
regulation. Rather, it created a new legal field of important economic activity
that could be subjected to unprecedented state control from direct price
regulation to outright public ownership.
CONCLUSION
Felix Frankfurter’s perspective on the historic nature of the level of state
direction of the economy pioneered in the Progressive Era has to some extent
been obscured by a powerful strain of exceptionalism in United States
historiography. The main feature of that exceptionalism is a continued reliance
on some relatively anachronistic ideas through which to tell the story of the
emergence of modern America—ideas like individualism, self-interest,
localism, classical liberalism, laissez-faire, the free market, the common law,
statelessness, and voluntarism. This interpretive tendency has kept scholars
from fully reckoning with the power of the American state and the role of
government in all aspects of modern social and economic life. This tendency
is certainly present in economic thought and some economic history. But the
problem is particularly acute in history and legal history. The continued
emphasis in legal history on judges, the common law, and the main categories
of nineteenth-century private law, and the relative neglect of statutes,
legislation, administrative law, executive rule making, and public regulation
has left a substantial and important portion of modern American governmental

134 Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Rate Regulation, in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
SCIENCES 104, 104 (1934) (emphasis added).
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history in the dark.135 Not a single aspect of American economic or social life
has remained untouched by the legal output of the modern administrative and
regulatory state, yet the historical emergence of that state remains relatively
unaccounted for. The origins of the modern American regulatory and
administrative state were firmly planted in legal and constitutional
developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With
respect to economic policy, those developments had little to do with ideas like
laissez-faire constitutionalism. They owed far more to broad-based movement
in law and political economy for the state control of American capitalism.

135 For signs of an important recent shift in legal scholarship, see CHLOE BREYER ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (5th ed. 2002); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (3d ed. 2001); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (rev. 2d ed. 2002).

